



















	 (Evidential	Externalism):	It’s	possible	that:	A	and	B	are	internal	twins	and	A	and	B	do	not	have	the	same	evidence.	(Silins	2005:	378)		Rather	than	eliciting	a	clash	with	any	kind	of	claim	about	our	access	to	our	evidence,	Silins’s	supervenience	argument	aims	to	spell	out	how	Evidential	Externalism	conflicts	with	the	following	thesis:		 (Equal	Justification):	Necessarily,	if	A	and	B	are	internal	twins,	then	A	is	justified	to	degree	n1	in	believing	P	to	degree	n2	just	in	case	B	is	justified	to	degree	n1	in	believing	P	to	degree	n2.		As	stressed	in	the	introduction,	Silins’s	point	isn’t	just	that	Evidential	Externalism	leads	to	counterexamples	to	Equal	Justification	(though	he	does	think	that	is	already	a	potential	problem),	but	rather	that	the	counterexamples	can	take	a	particular	form.	While	Silins	concedes	that	the	Evidential	Externalist	may	welcome	the	result	that	the	subject	in	the	good	case	can	be	more	doxastically	justified	than	the	subject	in	the	bad	case,	he	thinks	that	even	they	will	recoil	from	the	conclusion	that	the	subject	in	the	bad	case	might	come	out	ahead.	But	that’s	a	consequence	of	their	position,	Silins	argues,	given	only	assumptions	that	are	very	plausible	in	their	own	right.	These	assumptions	are	as	follows:		 (Assumption	1):	If	the	probability	of	P	on	one’s	evidence	is	n,	then	one’s	degree	of	confidence	in	P	ought	to	be	n.		(Assumption	2):	If	one’s	degree	of	confidence	ought	to	be	n,	and	one’s	actual	degree	of	confidence	diverges	from	n,	then	one’s	actual	degree	of	confidence	is	less	than	fully	justified	insofar	as	it	diverges	from	what	it	ought	to	be.	(Silins	2005:	387)10		So	one’s	degree	of	confidence	that	P	ought	to	match	the	evidential	likelihood	of	P	for	one,	and	if	it	doesn’t,	then	one’s	degree	of	confidence	is	less	than	fully	justified.	In	fact,	Silins	implicitly	appeals	to	a	natural	generalisation	of	Assumption	2,	which	we’ll	label	Assumption	2’:		 (Assumption	2’)	If	one’s	degree	of	confidence	ought	to	be	n,	and	one’s	actual	confidence	diverges	from	n,	then	one’s	actual	degree	of	confidence	is	less	than	fully	justified	insofar	as	it	diverges	from	what	it	ought	to	be,	and	is	more	or	less	justified	depending	on	how	much	it	diverges	from	what	it	ought	to	be.		We	can	see	why	the	final,	additional	clause	is	needed	by	examining	how	Silins	argues	that	Evidential	Externalism	leads	to	counterexamples	to	Equal	Justification.	For	now,	we’re	only	concerned	with	his	argument	that	Evidential	Externalism	entails	that	the	subject	in	the	good	case	can	be	more	justified	than	
																																																								10	While	the	formulations	are	taken	straight	from	Silins,	the	labels	are	ours.	
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the	subject	in	the	bad	case;	we’ll	turn	to	the	more	controversial-sounding	result	shortly.		Suppose	that	Gary	has	the	proposition	that	there	is	a	black	spider	in	front	of	him	as	part	of	his	evidence.	Gary’s	evidence	entails	that	he’s	not	a	brain	in	a	vat	being	deceived	into	thinking	that	there’s	a	black	spider	in	front	of	him.	His	internal	twin	in	the	bad	case,	Barry,	can’t	have	the	same	proposition11	as	part	of	his	evidence,	since	there	isn’t	a	black	spider	in	front	of	Barry;	his	evidence	will	instead	include	(say)	that	it	appears	to	him	that	there’s	a	black	spider	in	front	of	him.12	Since	Gary’s	evidence	is	entailing,	the	evidential	probability	for	him	that	he’s	not	a	brain	in	a	vat	being	deceived	into	thinking	that	there’s	a	black	spider	in	front	of	him	is	1.	Let	us	suppose	that	the	evidential	probability	of	that	same	proposition	for	Barry	is	less	than	.9.	Since	Gary	and	Barry	are	internal	twins,	they	share	the	same	degrees	of	confidence,	and	in	particular	each	is	.99	confident	that	he	is	not	a	brain	in	a	vat	being	deceived	into	thinking	that	there’s	a	black	spider	in	front	of	him.	Silins	concludes	(2005:	388):		 The	upshot	is	that	one	can	be	more	justified	in	the	good	case	than	the	bad	case,	if	Evidential	Externalism	is	true.		As	promised,	we	can	see	the	need	for	Silins	to	rely	on	Assumption	2’	here,	rather	than	on	Assumption	2	as	he	states	it.	Silins’s	own	statement	only	allows	us	to	conclude	that	neither	Barry	nor	Gary’s	degree	of	confidence	is	fully	justified;	it	is	the	additional	clause	present	in	Assumption	2’	that	enables	us	to	conclude	that	Gary	is	more	justified	than	Barry	in	the	example	described.		Silins’s	argument	from	Externalism	to	the	more	controversial-sounding	result	that	Barry	can	be	more	justified	than	Gary	is	just	as	straightforward.	This	time,	suppose	that	Gary	remembers	and	knows	that	he	had	a	banana	with	breakfast	this	morning,	but	he’s	not	maximally	confident	that	he	did	since	he	recognises	that	his	memory,	while	reliable,	is	not	infallible.	So	Gary	slightly	misjudges	the	force	of	the	evidence	he	has,	and	so	has	a	degree	of	confidence	of	.9	when	his	evidence	actually	gives	the	proposition	a	probability	of	1.	Barry’s	evidence	is	that	it	seems	to	him	that	he	had	a	banana	with	breakfast	this	morning,	and	this,	we’ll	suppose,	gives	the	proposition	that	he	did	an	evidential	probability	of	.9.	Let’s	also	suppose	that	both	Gary	and	Barry	have	a	degree	of	confidence	of	.9.		By	Assumption	1,	Barry’s	degree	of	confidence	is	just	as	it	ought	to	be,	while	Gary’s	is	not.	By	Assumption	2,	Barry’s	degree	of	confidence	is	more	justified	than	Gary’s.	Since	Gary	is	in	the	good	case	and	Barry	is	in	the	bad	case,	we	can																																																									11	Of	course,	if	Gary	and	Barry	are	distinct	subjects	then	we	aren’t	dealing	with	precisely	the	same	proposition.	As	Silins	notes	(2005:	399	n6),	Barry	may	have	to	be	Gary	in	a	different	world,	since	it’s	plausible	that	they	share	non-factive	but	de	se	beliefs.	These	complications	won’t	matter	to	any	of	the	points	made	in	the	text.	12	This	description	of	Barry’s	evidence	in	the	bad	case	isn’t	mandated	by	Evidential	Externalism,	but	it	is	very	natural	and	it	has	been	suggested	by	prominent	Externalists	(e.g.	Williamson	2000:	198-9	and	Pritchard	2011:	244).	Pritchard	develops	a	much	more	fine-grained	taxonomy	of	good	and	bad	cases	in	his	2012,	and	we	don’t	mean	to	suggest	that	he	would	accept	this	description	of	the	subject’s	evidence	in	all	the	variants	of	the	bad	case	that	he	considers.	
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conclude	that	a	subject	in	the	bad	case	can	have	a	more	justified	degree	of	confidence	than	their	internal	twin	in	the	good	case.13		Why	think	that	this	conclusion	is	problematic?	Silins	suggests	that	the	following	thesis	is	plausible:		 (The	Bad	Case	is	Never	Better):	Necessarily,	if	B	is	in	the	bad	case	and	A	is	an	internal	twin	of	B	in	the	good	case,	B	is	not	more	justified	in	believing	P	than	A.		Notice,	though,	that	this	claim	concerns	justification	in	believing,	whereas	Silins’s	assumptions	and	the	conclusion	we	have	drawn	from	them	concern	the	justification	of	degrees	of	confidence.	Moreover,	it’s	entirely	implausible	that	the	case	Silins	described	is	a	counterexample	to	The	Bad	Case	is	Never	Better,	as	stated.	Recall	that	Gary’s	evidence	entails	that	he	had	a	banana	with	breakfast	this	morning	and	he’s	.9	confident	that	he	did,	while	both	the	degree	of	confidence	Barry	ought	to	have	and	his	actual	degree	of	confidence	is	.9.	It	would	be	surprising	if	we	could	conclude	from	this	that	Barry	is	more	justified	in	believing	the	relevant	proposition	than	Gary	is;	if	anything,	there’s	some	inclination	to	say	the	exactly	opposite.		Our	diagnosis	of	what	goes	wrong	in	Silins’s	argument	is	that	he	too	freely	moves	back	and	forth	between	talk	of	the	degree	to	which	one	is	justified	in	believing	P	and	the	degree	to	which	one’s	degree	of	confidence	or	belief	that	P	is	justified.14	On	the	one	hand,	Silins’s	two	assumptions,	as	quoted	above,	are	explicitly	put	in	terms	of	‘one’s	degree	of	confidence’,	and	Equal	Justification	is	stated	in	terms	of	being	‘justified	to	degree	n1	in	believing	P	to	degree	n2’.	On	the	other,	the	crucial	‘plausible’	thesis	The	Bad	Case	is	Never	Better	is	put	in	terms	of	being	less	or	more	justified	in	believing	a	proposition	P.		We	can	bring	out	the	difference	between	these	two	notions	of	doxastic	justification	with	the	following	example	(appropriated	from	Zardini	2013:	387).	We	have	no	evidence	whatsoever	concerning	whether	Barack	Obama	had	eggs	for	breakfast	this	morning.	So	the	evidential	likelihood	of	both	the	proposition	that	he	did	have	eggs	and	its	negation	is	.5	for	us.	Our	degree	of	confidence	that	he	had	eggs	for	breakfast,	given	our	evidence,	should	plausibly	be	around	.5;																																																									13	Silins	notes	that	not	everyone	will	accept	his	first	assumption,	but	he	suggests	that	it’s	not	strictly	required	for	his	argument:	‘[a]s	long	as	one	ought	to	be	more	confident	in	some	propositions	in	the	good	case	than	in	the	bad	case,	one	will	sometimes	underestimate	one’s	evidence	in	the	good	case,	and	overestimate	one’s	evidence	in	the	bad	case’	(2005:	391).	Silins	doesn’t	expand	much	on	the	point,	but	presumably	the	idea	is	that	even	if	one’s	degree	of	confidence	that	P	need	not	match	the	evidential	likelihood	for	one	that	P,	it’s	very	plausible	that	a	subject	in	the	good	case	might	have	a	lower	degree	of	confidence	than	her	entailing	evidence	justifies,	and	there’s	nothing	that	stops	her	sharing	that	lower	degree	of	confidence	with	her	internal	twin	who	portions	her	confidence	perfectly	to	her	inferior	evidence.	Since	our	objections	to	the	supervenience	argument	don’t	require	us	to	take	issue	with	either	of	Silins’s	original	assumptions,	we’ll	leave	this	alternative	version	of	the	argument	aside	in	what	follows.	14	This	suggestion	about	where	Silins’s	argument	goes	wrong	has	been	made	before	in	the	literature:	see	Kennedy	2010:	85-6	Dunn	2012:	442	fn10.	However,	neither	Kennedy	nor	Dunn	develops	the	point	in	much	detail,	and	they	both	prefer	less	general,	more	involved	responses.	In	our	view,	those	alternative	responses	are	not	necessary.	
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we’re	justified	to	the	extend	that	we	regard	it	as	no	more	likely	than	not.	In	contrast,	the	degree	to	which	we’re	justified	in	believing	that	he	had	eggs	for	breakfast	is	minimal.	That’s	to	say,	we’re	not	at	all	justified	in	believing	this;	what	we’re	justified	in	doing	is	suspending	judgment	on	the	matter.		This	example	also	serves	to	bring	out	the	fact	that	the	two	assumptions	that	the	supervenience	argument	rests	on	are	only	plausible	because	they	concern	one’s	degrees	of	confidence,	rather	than	the	degrees	to	which	one	is	justified	in	believing.	It’s	plausible	enough	that	one’s	degrees	of	confidence	in	a	proposition	ought	to	match	its	evidential	probability	for	one,	and	that	they	are	unjustified	to	the	extent	that	there’s	a	mismatch.	But	as	the	above	example	illustrates,	the	degree	to	which	one	is	justified	in	believing	a	proposition	typically	won’t	match	that	proposition’s	evidential	probability	for	one,	nor	is	there	any	sense	in	which	it	ought	to	or	in	which	one	is	more	justified	if	it	does.15			Likewise,	and	this	is	crucial,	The	Bad	Case	is	Never	Better	is	only	remotely	plausible	when	it	is	stated,	as	Silins	in	fact	states	it,	in	terms	of	the	degree	to	which	one	has	justification	to	believe.	The	subject	in	the	bad	case	is	doing	so	badly	not	because	of	how	she	polices	her	epistemic	life,	but	because	of	the	uncooperative	nature	of	her	external	environment,	and	by	the	Evidential	Externalist’s	lights	these	environmental	factors	bear	on	what	evidence	she	has,	and	so	on	the	epistemic	standing	of	her	attitudes.	Given	this,	and	given	that	we’re	currently	working	under	the	assumption	that	it’s	not	transparent	to	one	what	one’s	evidence	is,	it’s	no	surprise	that	she	might	do	better	than	her	internal	twin	in	portioning	her	degree	of	confidence	in	some	proposition	to	her	evidence;	that’s	just	what	Silins’s	examples	serve	to	bring	out.	What	might	be	more	surprising	and	troubling	is	the	idea	that	the	subject	in	the	good	case	could	be	less	justified	in	believing	a	proposition	than	her	twin	in	the	bad	case	despite	her	superior	evidence.	But	as	we’ve	seen,	that’s	not	the	conclusion	that	we	can	derive	from	Silins’s	assumptions.		The	switch	from	talk	of	degrees	of	confidence	or	belief	to	talk	of	degrees	of	justification	to	believe	can	be	seen	quite	clearly	in	the	following	passage	(2005:	389):		 If	Evidential	Externalism	is	true,	it	turns	out	that	Gary’s	partial	belief	in	B	is	misplaced	by	a	wide	margin,	whereas	Barry’s	partial	belief	in	B	is	not	misplaced	at	all.	Indeed,	Barry’s	confidence	is	causally	based,	in	the	right	way,	on	the	weaker	evidence	he	has,	whereas	Gary’s	fails	to	be	adequately	adjusted	to	his	stronger	evidence.	Since	Gary	underestimates	his	evidence,	and	Barry’s	partial	belief	is	properly	adjusted	to	his	own	evidence,	the	subject	in	the	good	case	is	less	justified	in	believing	B.16		
																																																								15	Which	is	not	to	say	that	the	latter	doesn’t	determine	the	former;	in	the	example	in	the	text,	for	example,	that	the	proposition	that	Obama	had	eggs	for	breakfast	has	an	evidential	probability	(for	us)	of	.5	arguably	is	what	makes	it	the	case	that	we’re	justified	in	believing	this	proposition	to	around	degree	0.	16	Thanks	to	Lukas	Schwengerer	for	drawing	our	attention	to	this	passage.	
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There	are	a	couple	of	different	issues	in	this	passage	that	need	disentangling.	First,	there’s	an	insinuation	that	Gary’s	confidence	is	not	causally	based,	in	the	right	way,	on	his	evidence;	it’s	hard	not	to	hear	the	contrast	in	the	second	sentence	as	strongly	suggesting	this.	But	there	are	two	problems	with	this.	Recall,	firstly,	that	Silins	sets	up	his	example	by	stipulating	that	Gary	‘remembers	and	knows’	that	he	had	a	banana	with	his	breakfast	this	morning	(2005:	389),	and	it’s	not	clear	that	this	is	compatible	with	Gary	failing	to	base	his	confidence	properly	on	his	evidence	in	the	right	way.	Second,	it’s	not	clear	why	underestimating	one’s	evidence	should	render	it	the	case	that	one	has	failed	to	base	one’s	confidence	on	one’s	evidence	in	the	right	way.	Perhaps	these	worries	will	be	silenced	when	we	understand	‘in	the	right	way’	in	the	right	way,	but	Silins	doesn’t	say	much	about	this	notion.		The	more	important	issue	is	that	the	move	from	facts	about	Gary	and	Barry’s	‘partial	beliefs’	to	comparisons	between	the	degree	to	which	each	is	justified	in	believing	invites,	rather	than	avoids,	the	kinds	of	worries	that	we	have	raised.	It	doesn’t	follow	from	the	fact	that	B	is	more	justified	in	her	degree	of	confidence	in	P	than	A,	in	the	sense	that	she	has	better	adjusted	her	degree	of	confidence	to	her	evidence,	that	B	is	more	justified	in	believing	P	than	A	is.	To	go	back	to	our	earlier	example,	we’re	fully	justified	in	having	a	degree	of	confidence	of	.5	that	Obama	had	eggs	this	morning	even	though	we’re	not	justified	at	all	in	believing	that	he	did.	If	Obama	has	entailing	evidence	that	he	had	eggs	this	morning,	but	cautiously	only	forms	a	degree	of	confidence	of	.9	that	he	did,	then	his	degree	of	confidence	is	further	away	from	what	it	should	be,	according	to	Assumption	1,	than	ours	is,	and	in	that	sense	is	less	justified.	But	clearly	he’s	not	less	justified	in	believing	that	he	had	eggs	than	we	are.		Silins	has	a	fallback	point,	which	he	develops	in	response	to	a	different	objection	to	his	argument,	but	which	is	equally	relevant	given	the	criticism	we	have	made.	He	suggests	that	there’s	an	alternative	route	to	seeing	the	problem	with	Evidentialism	Externalism	that	the	supervenience	argument	is	trying	to	bring	out,	since	we	can	note	that	if	Externalism	is	true,	‘counterintuitive	assessments	of	beliefs	in	the	good	case	turn	out	to	be	correct’	(2005:	390):			 Intuitively,	our	ordinary	partial	beliefs	are	just	fine	as	they	are:	we	are	neither	more	nor	less	confident	in	our	ordinary	beliefs	than	we	should	be.	If	Evidential	Externalism	is	true,	however,	we	are	sometimes	less	confident	than	we	should	be,	given	our	evidence.	Although	the	view	does	not	have	skeptical	consequences,	it	implies	that	there	are	flaws	in	places	where	apparently	there	are	none.		Silins	goes	on	to	argue	that	it	may	even	be	that	we’re	typically	less	confident	than	we	ought	to	be,	if	evidential	externalism	is	true.	Now,	it’s	crucial	that	we	realize	that	Silins’s	point	is	not	that	if	evidential	externalism	is	true	then,	for	all	we	know,	we’re	sometimes	(or	typically)	less	confident	that	we	ought	to	be	given	our	evidence.	That	conclusion	seems	to	be	a	consequence	of	any	account	of	evidence	that	allows	that	we	may	not	always	be	able	to	recognise	precisely	what	our	evidence	is	and	to	what	degree	it	supports	a	given	proposition,	and	recall	that	Silins	is	explicitly	trying	to	offer	an	argument	against	Evidential	Externalism	that	
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does	not	rely	on	any	such	claim	about	our	access	to	our	evidence.	Rather,	Silins’s	point	is	that	Evidential	Externalism	commits	us	to	holding	that	this	possibility	is	in	fact	realized,	perhaps	on	a	rather	wide	scale.	The	reason	is	that	according	to	the	version	of	Externalism	that	Silins	focuses	on,	Entailing	Evidence	Externalism,	‘it	can	be	easy	to	be	in	possession	of	evidence	which	obviously	entails	contingent	propositions	about	the	environment’	(2005:	378).	Given	Silins’s	assumptions,	whenever	we	form	degrees	of	confidence	in	these	contingent	propositions	that	fall	short	of	1	we’ll	have	underestimated	our	evidence,	and	so	our	attitudes	will	be	less	than	fully	justified.		It’s	not	clear	to	us	that	there’s	much	for	the	Evidential	Externalist	to	worry	about	here.	Silins’s	own	conclusion	on	the	matter	is	as	follows	(2005:	390):		 Here	the	externalist	might	have	to	conclude	that	most	of	our	ordinary	partial	beliefs	are	somewhat	at	fault,	despite	the	fact	that	our	ordinary	beliefs	seem	fine	as	they	are.		That’s	probably	right,	but	this	doesn’t	strike	us	as	a	particularly	unpalatable	bullet	to	have	to	bite.	Unless	we	think	that	one’s	evidence	is	transparent	to	one,	it’s	hard	to	see	why	we	would	expect	our	ordinary	degrees	of	confidence	to	be	typically	right	on	the	money,	and	it’s	unclear	why	fairly	small	shortcomings	in	our	degrees	of	confidence	should	be	regarded	as	significant;	Silins	is	surely	right	that	we	think	that	our	degrees	of	confidence	are	‘just	fine	as	they	are’,	but	it’s	unclear	that	this	means	that	we	think	that	they	are	always	precisely	where	they	should	be	given	our	evidence;	rather	we	think	that,	exceptional	cases	aside,	the	discrepancies	aren’t	big	enough	to	matter.		
4.	Evidence	and	Scepticism		Finally,	we	turn	to	the	topic	of	scepticism.	As	we	noted	in	the	introduction,	it	has	often	been	observed	that	standard	arguments	for	scepticism	seem	to	take	Evidential	Internalism	for	granted	when	establishing	the	lemma	that	one’s	current	evidence	is	not	different	to	and	no	better	than	it	would	be	were	one	in	a	suitable	sceptical	scenario.	That	suggests	that	one	natural	way	to	undermine	such	sceptical	arguments	is	to	adopt	Evidential	Externalism.	Given	that	few	of	us	want	to	be	landed	with	sceptical	conclusions,	this	seems	to	put	Externalism	at	a	considerable	advantage.	Silins	contests	this	claimed	advantage,	arguing	that	the	Evidential	Internalist	is	at	least	as	well	placed	to	resist	drawing	sceptical	conclusions	as	the	Externalist.	This	section	critically	evaluates	Silins’s	argument.		The	sceptical	reasoning	in	question	contends	that	one	isn’t	justified	in	believing	that	one	isn’t	a	handless	brain	in	a	vat.	This	isn’t	something	one	has	a	priori	justification	to	believe,	and	so	one’s	justification	had	better	be	experiential.	But	given	Evidential	Internalism,	one’s	evidence	can	be	no	better	than	that	possessed	by	one’s	internal	twin	who	is	a	handless	brain	in	a	vat,	and	the	kind	of	evidence	available	to	one’s	envatted	twin	isn’t	good	enough	to	justify	one	in	believing	that	one	isn’t	envatted:		
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To	motivate	this	claim,	the	skeptic	may	stress	that	the	hypothesis	entails	you	have	the	experiences	you	do.	In	particular,	since	the	skeptical	hypothesis	predicts	that	you	have	an	experience	as	of	having	hands,	you	should	respond	to	your	experience	as	of	having	hands	by	raising	your	confidence	in	the	skeptical	hypothesis,	just	as	you	should	increase	your	confidence	in	any	hypothesis	when	you	discover	that	something	it	predicts	is	true.	And	given	that	you	should	raise	your	confidence	that	the	skeptical	hypothesis	is	true	in	response	to	your	experience,	your	experience	does	not	provide	you	with	justification	to	believe	that	the	skeptical	hypothesis	is	false.	(2005:	396)		The	Evidential	Externalist	has	a	quick	response	they	can	make	here,	contending	that	one	has	evidence,	lacked	by	one’s	twin	in	the	sceptical	scenario,	that	is	not	entailed	by	the	sceptical	hypothesis,	and	which	in	fact	entails	that	the	sceptical	hypothesis	is	false.	So	one	can	have	justification	to	believe	propositions	about	the	external	world,	including	that	one	is	not	a	brain	in	a	vat	(though	as	Silins	notes,	the	externalist	may	still	owe	us	an	account	of	the	details).	Assuming	this	response	to	the	argument	is	satisfactory	and	that	the	Internalist	cannot	match	it,	Externalism	seems	to	have	the	edge	here.		Let’s	concede,	for	the	sake	of	argument,	that	the	Externalist	has	something	plausible	to	say	about	how	one	is	able	to	have	justification	for	one’s	beliefs	about	the	external	world	in	the	good	case.	The	apparent	advantage	over	Evidential	Internalism	starts	to	look	suspect,	Silins	argues,	when	we	ask	the	Externalist	whether	one’s	unfortunate	envatted	twin	also	has	justification	for	their	beliefs	about	the	external	world.	It’s	natural	to	think	that	the	Externalist	must	deny	this,	since	if	they	concede	that	one’s	twin	does	have	justification,	then	they’ll	need	to	say	how	this	is	possible	despite	the	twin	lacking	the	kind	of	entailing	evidence	that,	according	to	the	Externalist,	we’re	able	to	possess	when	things	go	well.	And	it’s	unclear	how	the	Externalist	could	have	any	resources	for	meeting	that	explanatory	burden	that	aren’t	in	principle	available	to	the	Internalist	too.		Better,	then,	for	the	Evidential	Externalist	to	deny	that	one’s	envatted	twin	even	has	justification	for	their	beliefs	about	the	external	world.	However,	Silins	doesn’t	think	that	the	path	is	clear	for	the	Externalist	to	deny	this.	First,	doing	so	would	require	them	to	also	deny	the	thesis	Equal	Justification,	discussed	in	the	previous	section:		 (Equal	Justification):	Necessarily,	if	A	and	B	are	internal	twins,	then	A	is	justified	to	degree	n1	in	believing	P	to	degree	n2	just	in	case	B	is	justified	to	degree	n1	in	believing	P	to	degree	n2.		The	Externalist	will,	we	suspect,	have	few	qualms	about	denying	this	thesis.	However,	Silins	notes	that	the	Externalist	is	forced	to	also	deny	the	following	thesis	concerning	outright	belief:		 (Outright	Equal	Justification):	Necessarily,	if	A	and	B	are	internal	twins,	then	A	is	justified	simpliciter	in	having	an	outright	belief	in	P	just	in	case	B	is	justified	simpliciter	in	having	an	outright	belief	in	P.	
	 14	
	The	Externalist	has	a	story	about	why	this	thesis	is	false,	as	we	have	already	seen	in	the	passage	from	Silins	quoted	above;	one’s	evidence	in	the	good	case	entails	that	the	sceptical	hypothesis	is	false,	while	one’s	twin’s	evidence	in	the	bad	case	is	predicted	by	the	sceptical	hypothesis,	and	so	it’s	a	mistake	to	think	that	the	former	can	be	justified	in	believing	something	only	if	the	latter	can	be	too.	However,	Silins	has	offered	an	argument	in	favour	of	Outright	Equal	Justification,	and	so	the	Externalist	who	wants	to	hold	that	one	has	justification	to	believe	one	has	hands	while	one’s	envatted	twin	does	not	has	some	work	to	do.	Here	we	take	up	that	challenge	on	the	Externalist’s	behalf.		Silins’s	argument	for	Outright	Equal	Justification	starts	from	the	following	premise:		 (Suspension):	Necessarily,	if	one	lacks	justification	to	believe	P,	and	one	lacks	justification	to	believe	~P,	then	one	has	justification	to	suspend	judgment	in	P.	(Silins	2005:	392)		In	fact,	Silins	implicitly	relies	on	a	slightly	stronger	thesis,	to	the	effect	that	having	justification	to	believe	P,	having	justification	to	believe	~P,	and	having	justification	to	suspend	judgment	on	whether	P	exhaust	the	options,	so	that	if	we	can	rule	out	any	two	of	these	for	some	subject	and	a	proposition	P,	then	we	can	conclude	that	the	third	is	the	case.	Let’s	grant	Suspension	even	in	this	stronger	form	for	the	sake	of	argument.		Recall	Gary	and	Barry,	internal	twins	in	a	good	case	and	a	sceptical	scenario	respectively,	both	of	whom	believe	that	there	is	a	dial	in	front	of	them.	What	Silins	tries	to	show	is	that	if	Gary	has	justification	to	believe	this	(as	the	anti-sceptical	Externalist	supposes),	then	Barry	does	too.	According	to	Silins,	it	can’t	be	the	case	that	Gary	is	justified	in	believing	that	there’s	a	dial	in	front	of	Gary	while	his	internal	twin	Barry	is	justified	in	believing	that	there	is	not	a	dial	in	front	of	Barry.	Likewise,	Silins	holds,	it	can’t	be	the	case	that	Gary	is	justified	in	believing	that	there’s	a	dial	in	front	of	Gary	while	Barry	is	justified	in	suspending	judgment	on	whether	there	is	a	dial	in	front	of	Barry.	Given	these	two	claims,	since	Gary	is	justified	in	believing	there’s	a	dial	in	front	of	him,	it	follows	that	Barry	is	neither	justified	in	believing	there	isn’t	a	dial	in	front	of	Barry	nor	in	suspending	judgment	on	this.	An	application	of	Suspension,	generalised	as	discussed	in	the	previous	paragraph,	delivers	the	desired	conclusion	that	Barry	has	justification	to	believe	that	there’s	a	dial	in	front	of	him	(Silins	2005:	392-3).		It	seems	clear	where	the	Evidential	Externalist	will	want	to	resist	this	argument.	It’s	the	premise	that	it’s	impossible	for	Gary	to	be	justified	in	believing	the	proposition	in	question	while	his	internal	twin	Barry	is	justified	in	suspending	judgment;	as	we	noted	earlier,	following	Silins	himself	in	the	passage	quoted	above,	the	Externalist	has	at	least	the	beginnings	of	an	account	of	why	Gary’s	entailing	evidence	is	good	enough	for	him	to	have	justification,	while	Barry’s	weaker	evidence	is	not	good	enough.	However,	Silins	offers	the	following	point	in	support	of	his	crucial	premise:		
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[S]uppose	Barry	did	suspend	judgment	in	the	proposition	that	there	is	a	dial	in	front	of	him,	despite	the	fact	that	there	seems	to	be	a	dial	in	front	of	him,	and	despite	the	fact	that	no	defeating	evidence	is	available	to	him.	I	take	it	to	be	very	implausible	that	Barry	would	be	justified	in	suspending	judgment	in	the	matter.	(2005:	392)		This	point	seems	ineffectual	against	the	Evidential	Externalist,	for	at	least	two	reasons.	First,	that	it	appears	to	Barry	in	all	respects	as	if	there’s	a	dial	in	front	of	him	and	that	he	has	no	defeating	evidence	is	just	what	the	sceptical	hypothesis	
predicts,	leaving	it	very	unclear	how	Barry	could	be	justified	in	believing	that	there	is	a	dial	in	front	of	him	on	this	basis;	recall	once	more	that	this	is	precisely	the	line	of	reasoning	which	Silins	puts	in	the	Externalist’s	mouth	in	the	passage	quoted	above.	Moreover,	it’s	very	natural	for	the	Externalist	to	say	that	if	Barry’s	evidence	is	predicated	both	by	the	hypothesis	that	there’s	a	dial	in	front	of	him	and	by	the	hypothesis	that	he’s	a	brain	in	a	vat	being	presented	with	a	mere	appearance	that	there’s	a	dial	in	front	of	him,	then	Barry	is	justified	in	suspending	judgment	on	whether	there’s	a	dial	in	front	of	him.	If	there’s	a	pretheoretical	intuition	to	the	contrary,	the	Externalist	seems	to	be	in	a	strong	position	to	insist	that	it	is	trumped	by	theoretical	considerations,	given	that	the	Internalist	hasn’t	discharged	the	explanatory	burden	of	explaining	how	it’s	possible	for	Barry	to	be	justified	in	believing	that	there’s	a	dial	in	front	of	him	on	the	basis	of	evidence	that	is	predicted	by	the	hypothesis	that	any	appearances	of	a	dial	are	misleading.		Second,	the	Externalist	can	also	explain	away	the	intuition	about	this	case	that	Silins	identifies.	The	question	at	hand	concerns	whether	Barry	has	justification	to	suspend	judgment	that	there’s	a	dial	in	front	of	him,	given	his	evidence	in	the	bad	case.	Notice,	however,	that	Silins	invites	us	to	respond	to	this	question	by	supposing	that	Barry	in	fact	suspends	judgment	and	then	considering	how	intuitive	it	is	to	say	that	he’s	justified	in	so	doing.	This	raises	a	number	of	issues,	but	in	particular	we	note	that	the	Externalist	will	agree	that	there’s	something	very	odd	about	Barry	suspending	judgment;	given	what	Barry	(wrongly)	takes	his	evidence	to	be,	it	is	natural	for	him	to	believe	that	there’s	a	dial	in	front	of	him	with	considerable	confidence.	Putting	the	point	in	terminology	familiar	from	the	debate	over	the	knowledge	norm	of	assertion	(e.g.	Williamson	2000:	257),	the	Externalist	will	agree	that	it’s	reasonable	for	Barry	to	believe	that	there’s	a	dial	in	front	of	him,	and	that	it	would	be	unreasonable	for	him	to	suspend	judgment;	but	they	will	insist	that	we	guard	against	conflating	those	claims	with	ones	about	what	Barry	has	justification	to	believe.	In	inviting	us	to	suppose	that	Barry	in	fact	suspends	judgment	and	then	inviting	intuitions	about	that	scenario,	Silins	inadvertently	encourages	precisely	this	conflation—or	so	the	Externalist	should	say.			The	upshot	is	that	the	Evidential	Externalist	has	a	clear	escape	from	Silins’s	dilemma.	They	shouldn’t	concede	that	subjects	like	Barry	have	justification	for	their	beliefs	about	the	external	world,	and	they	should	deny	Outright	Equal	Justification	along	with	Equal	Justification.	As	a	result,	they	face	the	burden	of	explaining	why	a	subject	in	Barry’s	evidential	state	is	justified	in	suspending	judgment.	But	given	that	Barry’s	evidence	for	believing	there’s	a	dial	in	front	of	
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him	is	predicated	by	sceptical	scenarios	in	which	there’s	no	dial	in	front	of	him,	Externalists	(not	implausibly)	takes	their	burden	to	be	easier	to	discharge	than	that	faced	by	the	Internalist,	who	has	to	explain	how	Barry	could	be	justified	on	the	basis	of	such	inconclusive	evidence.	If	one	initially	thought	that	the	Evidential	Externalist	was	at	a	genuine	advantage	here,	we	contend	that	nothing	in	Silins’s	discussion	should	change	one’s	mind.		
Conclusion		In	this	paper,	we	have	offered	a	comprehensive	reassessment	of	the	case	against	Evidential	Externalism	and	for	its	Internalist	rival,	and	we	have	reached	a	very	different	conclusion	to	Silins.	Silins	closes	his	paper	by	writing	that	‘[t]he	overall	case	for	Evidential	Externalism	might	turn	out	to	be	stronger,	but	the	case	for	Evidential	Internalism	is	not	weak’	(2005:	398-9).	We	disagree;	re-examining	the	arguments	that	Silins	has	advanced	on	the	Internalist’s	behalf	suggests	that	the	case	for	their	thesis	is	rather	weak	indeed.17			
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